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Bias in the composition of interest communities is often explained by reference to variations in 
the collective action constraint facing voluntary and nonvoluntary organizations. But with the excep-
tion of literature on PAC formation, studies of direct institutional mobilization are rare. More often
than not, their mobilization advantages vis-à-vis problems of collective action are simply assumed.
This paper fills this gap by testing the collective action hypothesis on direct institutional mobiliza-
tion. We argue that the PAC studies are flawed as tests of this hypothesis; they study the wrong mode
of political activity and use selective samples and limited research designs. We develop a new test
using state data on seven types of institutions to solve these problems. We also compare the collec-
tive action problem facing institutions to the related problems facing voluntary organizations. We find
strong evidence of collective action problems in institutional mobilization, problems that make inter-
est populations of nonvoluntary and voluntary organizations appear far more similar than commonly
thought.
The literature on organized interests has long noted that interest systems are
often biased in their composition. Using a common measure of bias of the inter-
est system by examining the distribution of participants minimally active in
various stages of the policy process, a number of scholars have noted that the dis-
tribution of interests before government reflects only poorly the distribution of
interests in society (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Berry 1999, 20; Caldeira and
Wright 1990; Golden 1998; Salisbury 1984; Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman
1984; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991, 59). While venues vary, vol-
untary organizations—associations of institutions and membership groups—are
more often than not a minority among organized interests lobbying government.
And their minority status has increased over recent decades. For example, the
proportion of the organized interests registered to lobby state governments has
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increased from 39.55% in 1980 to 49.02% in 1990 and nearly 57.81% in 1997
(Gray and Lowery 2001a).
There is great controversy over whether and under what conditions bias in the
composition of the interest community biases policy outcomes (Denzau and
Munger 1986; Lowery and Gray 2001; Salisbury 1990, 228; Schattschneider
1960, 35; Smith 2000). While this is an important question, it is not one we
address here. Rather, we consider an infrequently examined assumption many
scholars make about the source or cause of bias in the composition of interest
communities. Many observers account for the dominance of firms, traditional
economic interests, and institutions via reference to Olson’s (1963, 141–48)
analysis of collective action. Groups with large stakes have greater incentives and
fewer costs in overcoming barriers to organization than larger latent groups with
smaller stakes. Schlozman and Tierney (1986, 130) were especially explicit about
explaining bias in lobbying presence by reference to variations in free riding, and
their interpretation has become standard in both graduate and undergraduate text-
books on interest representation (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 115; Nownes
2001, 52–54). We examine this assumption by testing Olson’s collective action
hypothesis on direct lobbying by institutions in the American states. Our test has
important implications for the study of interest communities. Evidence that col-
lective action issues bear more heavily on institutional mobilization than is com-
monly thought, combined with the now substantial body of work that free riding
does not solely determine the fate of voluntary organizations, would not, however,
invalidate Olson’s analysis. Indeed, it would extend his work by suggesting that
the collective action problem has a wider application than commonly appreci-
ated. Rather, the key implication of finding that institutional mobilization is also
severely constrained by free riding concerns our understanding of bias in inter-
est communities. Simply put, we would need to develop new theories of bias that
go beyond simple assumptions about variations in the severity of collective action
problems across different types of organized interests. We first discuss the
common assumption that collective action problems bear unequally across insti-
tutions and voluntary organizations and identify a number of problems in the
limited evidence now available on institutional mobilization. We then develop a
new test sidestepping these problems using comparative state data on seven types
of institutions. We also provide a more general, albeit tentative, comparison of
the severity of the collective action problems facing institutions and voluntary
organizations.
Collective Action, Institutions, and PACs
The broad consensus about the role of collective action issues in accounting
for bias in the composition of interest communities is puzzling in two ways. First,
assessments of the severity of collective action problems for voluntary organiza-
tions have been tempered over the last 30 years. Free riding has been found to
be less common than Olson had expected in both laboratory settings (Marwell
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and Ames 1979, 1980) and the real world of organized interests (Berry 1999).
Some scholars explain this gap by discounting the sharp distinction he makes
between collective and selective benefits (Clark and Wilson 1961; Salisbury
1969). Others discuss how cognitive biases (Hansen 1985; Moe 1980) and orga-
nizational contexts (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) promote mobilization.
And still others highlight the importance of subsidies by patrons, entrepreneurs,
and other organizations (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Salisbury 1969; Walker
1991). While few scholars fully reject Olson’s analysis as applied to the mobi-
lization of voluntary organizations, the accumulation of addenda has reached a
point where many now ask, as Baumgartner and Leech have phrased it, “whether
the problems discussed by Olson may have been given more prominence in the
interest-group literature than they deserve” (1998, 75),
The second part of the puzzle concerns the mobilization of institutions—organ-
izations without members. That is, bias in the interest system is thought to derive
from the relative differences in propensities to mobilize between voluntary and
nonvoluntary organizations. Yet, with the exception of the literature on PACs,
examined more fully below, studies of direct lobbying by institutions are extraor-
dinarily rare. More often than not, the mobilization advantages of institutions vis-
à-vis issues of collective action are simply assumed. The lack of attention to direct
institutional mobilization likely arises, as suggested by Baumgartner and Leech
(1998, 67), from Olson’s emphasis on the incentives of individuals in The Logic
of Collective Action. But he well recognized that institutions also face incentives
to free riding. That is, participation rates in direct lobbying by institutions may
be lower in states (or industries) with many firms than in states (or industries)
with few.1 If so, then biases in the composition of interest communities cannot
be readily explained by simply claiming that some kinds of organizations are
subject to free-riding problems while others are not. Instead, we need to compare
the severity of the collective action problem across different types of interest
organizations.
Whether or not the rate of direct lobbying by institutions varies with the size
of institutional populations depends, according to Olson’s logic, on what they
lobby for. If, as Salisbury (1984) has suggested, institutions lobby primarily for
selective benefits, rates of participation in direct lobbying should not vary with
the number of institutions in a state or an industry. But if, as suggested by Grier,
Munger, and Roberts (1991, 728), institutions typically seek collective goods that
benefit a whole industry, then we should observe higher rates of free riding in
populations with more institutions. It is, of course, almost certainly true that insti-
tutions lobby for both collective and selective benefits. So it is the relative balance
of these two lobbying objectives that determines the severity of the collective
action problem institutions face. To date, these competing hypotheses have been
tested almost exclusively in terms of the founding of national-level PACs by busi-
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1 A second type of collective action issue bearing on insitutions not studied here concerns the rate
of participation of institutions in trade associations, a type of voluntary organization.
ness firms. Indeed, the collective action issue is central to the PAC literature. As
Grier, Munger, and Roberts noted in their analysis of PAC sponsorship, “Mancur
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action provides the theoretical cornerstone for most
discussions of corporate political participation. At the heart of Olson’s theory is
the rational calculus of individual agents leading to a decision to join in lobby-
ing government or not” (1991, 728).
Unfortunately, the PAC literature provides mixed evidence on the importance
of collective action problems for institutions. Controlling for a variety of vari-
ables that might influence mobilization rates (including the degree to which
industries are regulated, firm size, profitability, and a number of other variables),
some scholars have found that the number of firms in an industry is negatively
related to PAC sponsorship (Andres 1985; Masters and Keim 1985; McKeown
1994). This finding, of course, is consistent with the notion that some portion of
what institutions lobby for includes collective goods. Other scholars, however,
have found that the rate of free riding by failure to sponsor a PAC does not
increase with the number of firms in an industry (Boies 1989; Grier, Munger, and
Roberts 1991, 1994; Hart 2001; Humphries 1991). Given Olson’s analysis, this
finding is consistent with the notion that institutions lobby for selective goods.
Still others find more mixed results indicative of some, if limited, free riding
(Mitchell, Hansen, and Jepsen 1997). So, while Olson’s hypothesis is central to
the PAC literature, it does not provide a definitive answer on the importance of
free riding for institutions.
But even if the PAC literature agreed on the importance of free riding to insti-
tutions, studying PACs would still provide a poor test of the impact of collective
action issues on rates of institutional lobbying.2 First, while a valid indicator of
campaign finance activity, PAC sponsorship is a poor measure of engaging in pol-
itics (Hansen and Mitchell 2000, 896). PACs are but one tool for gaining access
to the political process and not, therefore, evidence of engagement with the polit-
ical process per se (Hansen and Mitchell 2000, 892; Herndon 1982; Matasar
1986, 52; Sabato 1984; Sorauf 1984, 73; Wright 1989, 1990). Further, PAC use
is not widespread in comparison to other modes of political engagement (Gais
1996, 78). If PAC formation is a minor means of political activity by organized
interests already committed to seeking political influence, they constitute a sin-
gularly inappropriate venue for studying collective action issues. The collective
action problem should bear on the decision to engage in any political activity, not
the means or intensity by which that engagement is expressed (Gray and Lowery
1997). We need to study the broadest, most basic form of political participation
by institutions—lobbying—to assess validly the severity of the collective action
problems they face.3
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2 The PAC studies tell us a great deal about the campaign finance activity of large firms. Thus, they
make important contributions to knowledge about substantively important issues. We only suggest
that they are singularly inappropropriate as tests of the collective action hypothesis.
3 Hansen and Mitchell’s (2000) study of Fortune 500 firms provides one of the few tests of the 
collection action hypothesis at the national level focused on lobbying. But given the lack of federal
Second, although not inherent, most PAC studies examine the campaign finance
activities of only large firms—Fortune 500 (Andres 1985; Boies 1989; Hansen
and Mitchell 2000; Mitchell, Hansen, and Jepsen 1997), Fortune 100 (Humphries
1991; Masters and Keim 1985) or even smaller subsets of firms (Hart 2001;
McKeown 1994). These truncated samples are troubling given that the absolute
size of the expected returns on political activity are likely to be larger for larger
firms, and large firms are more visible politically. Both factors surely enhance
incentives to overcome free riding. Thus, attention to only large firms surely min-
imizes variance on traits that likely bear directly on propensities to free ride. What
is needed is attention to the full population of institutions that might engage in
political activity.
Third, PAC studies employ a single interest population, inter-industry research
design. That is, they typically examine PAC sponsorship across industries/firms
within a single population of industries/firms. This strategy might be effective if
we could plausibly account for the many differences among industries/firms that
shape their proclivities to engage in political activity. Despite some heroic efforts,
controlling for these differences is difficult given complex variations in the
economies of scale of political organization, the heterogeneity of interests, and
range of policy interests across industrial sectors. Thus, PAC models are likely
to be underspecified. A more tractable research design would entail comparing
within given industries across populations in which the numbers of firms that
might lobby vary, thereby controlling for a variety of forces operative across
industries.
Modeling the Collective Action Problem
In contrast to most prior studies, we examine direct lobbying by institutions
rather than the more limited behavior of sponsoring a PAC. We examine lobby-
ing behavior in the states, which provide both substantial variance in the size of
the full institutional populations that might lobby and valid lobby registration
data. We will see below that shifting attention to states has important advantages.
But it has costs as well. There were only 4,000 national PACs in 1997, and federal
PAC registration data provides substantial information on their sponsors. In con-
trast, 34,680 organizations registered to lobby in the states in 1997, and state reg-
istration data is often skimpy, sometimes providing no more than the name of the
organization. Given the sheer number of cases and the paucity of information
about specific firms, state registration data cannot be coded in the same detail as
federal PACs. So, we must employ more highly aggregated categories of indus-
tries than is common in the PAC literature. Higher levels of aggregation are also
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lobbying data, they rely on older measures of doubtful validity (Baumgartner and Leech 2001)—the
number of Washington representatives and hearing appearances. Further, neither really speaks to the
core behavior examined by the collective action hypothesis—the decision to engage in any political
activity.
needed because states are the unit of analysis. That is, industries had to be aggre-
gated at a sufficiently high level that an adequate number of direct institutional
lobby registrations could be observed in each state for valid analysis. For
example, manufacturing firms comprise our largest sector with a total of 3,088
registrations in 1997, an average of only 61.76 per state. If these 61.76 registra-
tions were coded any more finely, valid analysis would be very difficult. Given
these problems, we analyze participation in direct lobbying by all of the institu-
tions in the following seven economic sectors, with their total number of lobby
registrations and the mean number of registrations per state listed in brackets: (1)
agricultural services, forestry, and fishing [280, 5.60], (2) natural resources [908,
18.16], (3) construction [323, 6.46], (4) manufacturing [3,088, 61.76], (5) trans-
portation, utilities, and communication (T-U-C) [2,423 48.46], (6) finance, insur-
ance, and real estate (F-I-RE) [1,664, 33.28], and (7) local government [2,277,
45.54]. The seven sectors were selected because they allow us to readily match
prior counts of lobby registrations by economic sectors with data on firm popu-
lations in states. The seven sectors accounted for 16,476 lobby registrations by
organizations in 1997, 47.82% of the total. The proportions of institutions
(58.63), associations (21.27), and membership groups (20.01) in our sample
sectors are comparable to the full population.
The dependent variable, participation rate, is measured by the proportion of
firms or local governments within a sector in each state registered to lobby in
1997. The lobby registration data were gathered by mail or Web page from state
agencies responsible for their maintenance.4 After purging the lists of state agen-
cies in those states requiring their registrations, organizations registered to
lobby—rather than the lobbyist—were coded on several dimensions, including
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4 The coding of lobby registrations by economic sector was based on the Bureau of the Census
coding of economic sectors. Examples of the organizations with in sector are as follows: natural
resources/commercial resource development (oil and mining companies and associations, miners
associations, drilling companies, and oil, water, and environmental-geotechnical organizations); con-
struction/housing (construction firms, contractors associations, landlord associations, tenant unions,
appropriate unions, and paving companies); Finance-Insurance-Real Estate (banks, credit unions,
banking associations, finance agencies, investment and securities companies, appropriate economic
development institutions, mortgage brokers, credit bureaus, realtors, credit card and check cashing
organizations, student loan agencies, estate/trust managers, and bond organizations); agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries (farm organizations, food processors, timber companies and associations,
loggers associations, appropriate unions, corporate farms, sea food/fishing industry); intergovern-
mental relations and local governments (local governments and associations, appropriate unions,
public employee and retiree groups, government boards, municipal associations, and port authorities,
police and fire associations, education associations, school districts); manufacturing (companies pro-
ducing goods, manufacturing associations); transportation, utilities, and communication (transporta-
tion companies, trucking companies and associations, transit authorities and advocates, airline, bus,
railroads, and steamship companies, related unions, electric companies, phone and water companies,
utility boards, TV and radio stations and associations, newspapers, broadcaster and journalist asso-
ciations, publishing companies, and entertainment companies, and internet providers). Of the matches
between the firm and lobby registration data, the most problematic match arises from exclusion from
the local government count of a few public utilities included in the T-U-C count.
organizational type (institution, membership group, or association) and interest
content (27 categories of substantive interests), using directories of organizations,
associations, and groups and the Web pages of individual organizations. A second
coder then examined the coding assignments with discrepancies resolved via dis-
cussion between the two coders. The data on number of firms in each state in
1997 were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Web site. The Census Bureau
(http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/defterm.html) reports both numbers of firms and
establishments by states. Because they are so highly correlated (r > .99), we
employ number of firms. Data on the number of local governments—including
counties, municipalities, townships, schools districts, and special districts—in
1997 were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S.
Department of Commerce 2000, 299).
Two problems may undermine the validity of our participation measure. First,
state lobby laws vary in terms of registration and reporting requirements and the
stringency of their sanctions. If these reflect variations in the relative costs of lob-
bying across the states, then they may well account for variations in free riding.
In states with minimal requirements, institutions may be more inclined to rou-
tinely register to lobby. But while lobby laws vary somewhat, registration costs
are not high in any state. More to the point, previous research using two standard
measures of regulatory stringency indicates that these variations have little impact
on numbers of lobby registrations (Lowery and Gray 1994, 1997) or the diver-
sity (Gray and Lowery 1998) of state interest communities. A second problem
concerns the potential for some interest organizations to register in many states.
If so, the numerator and denominator in the participation measure may tap some-
what different populations. This potential confound, however, does not seem to
be too severe empirically. Of the 21,089 distinct organizations registered to lobby
in the states in 1997, 18,267 (86.62%) were registered in but a single state, pre-
sumably the state in which they do business (Wolak et al. 2002). Even among the
2,831 organizations with multistate registrations, the mode was two, the median
three, and the mean only 5.73 registrations. Thus, the participation measure is not
seriously distorted by out-of-state registrations.5
We have already noted some of the costs of using state rather than the firm or
industry data typically used in the PAC literature. But our use of state data offers
one major advantage beyond simply looking at the full population of institutions
that might engage in lobbying, rather than only large firms. Because we are using
a multipopulation, within-industry research design, we have less need to control
for a number of variables essential to the specifications of the PAC literature. By
comparing participation rates within industries but across states, most of the vari-
ables in the PAC studies used to control for differences across industries are con-
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5 To further control for multistate registrations, models not reported here included Wolak et al.’s
(2002) measure of the degree to which state lobbying populations were dominated by within-state
registrations. When included, the localism index produced an incorrectly signed estimate in all cases
but one, none were significant, and little else in the results was influenced.
stants in our analyses. We do not, for example, need to account for variations in
the heterogeneity of interests or economies of scale in representation across
industries. And it is unlikely the variations across the states in the regulation of
a given industry, like local government or financial services, are as large as vari-
ations in regulations across industries.
Still, we introduce a number of controls to account for plausible differences
across the states that might influence participation rates. First, we control for the
severity of the economic problems in each sector. Truman’s disturbance theory
of mobilization (1951) and Lowery and Gray’s (1995) ESA model of interest
system density suggest that organizations are more likely to lobby when threat-
ened. Following Plotke’s (1992) argument that business mobilization is associ-
ated with falling profits, we measure such threats with the absolute growth in
current dollar gross state product (GSP, in millions of dollars) derived from the
industry from 1992 to 1997. If sector GSP growth in a given state is higher than
in other states, its member firms should be less inclined to lobby.
Second, we control for the level of party competition in a state. Lowery and
Gray (1995) suggest that organizations are more likely to mobilize when the out-
party is more likely to become the in-party, thereby threatening old benefits and
creating opportunities for new benefits. State party competition is measured by
a folded Ranney index for the 1995–98 period.
Third, we control for the overall size of the interest community exclusive of
the number of organizations in a given industrial sector. Lowery and Gray (1998a)
and Gray and Lowery (2001a) suggest that institutions are more likely to lobby
when interest systems are crowded. Under such conditions, trade associations
have incentives to inflate their presence by encouraging their member firms to
lobby on their own in support of the association so as to increase the frequency
and volume of their messages.
Fourth, we control for the number of associations representing the industry
registered to lobby state legislatures. Large states are more likely to support a
greater number of finely targeted associations than are smaller states. Under such
conditions, firms may believe that the associations to which they belong ade-
quately represent their interests, depressing the likelihood that they will lobby on
their own. In states with fewer associations, however, firms may believe that they
have little choice but to lobby directly. Sector associations (voluntary organiza-
tions with institutions as members) were readily distinguished from membership
groups (voluntary organizations with individuals as members) within most of the
economic sectors. Indeed, most have few membership organizations, and these
are typically unions or professional associations. But this distinction was less
clear for the agricultural sector where membership groups like Georgia’s Cattle-
men’s Association function much like trade associations in other sectors. In the
agriculture case, therefore, membership groups and associations are tallied in the
variable measuring the number of trade associations in the sector.6
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6 Essentially the same results obtained using the standard coding for agricultural organizations.
Finally, we control for the average size of firms within states. While finding
quite mixed evidence on free riding, the PAC literature is nearly uniform in
finding that firm size matters. Firms with more assets, sales, and/or employees
are more likely to sponsor PACs. To some extent, we control for this factor with
our within-industry design; firm size across the states within industries is more
likely to be similar than across industries within states. But some states might
still, on average, have larger firms than others. We control for average firm size
with the ratio of 1997 sector GSP to its number of firms.
Collective Action and Direct Institutional Lobbying
We must first establish that the seven sectors reflect more than a single distri-
bution of institutions. The sectors vary in size, with a 50-state average of only
453.82 natural resource firms in the smallest sector and an average of 13,280.12
construction firms in the largest. A more troubling concern would be if the same
states always held the same relative position in terms of number of institutions,
effectively collapsing our seven sectors into one. But while large states tend to
have more of all types of institutions than smaller states, there is considerable
variation in the rank order of the states across the sectors. Rank order correla-
tions of the numbers of institutions in the sectors range from a high of only .451
for agricultural and manufacturing firms to a low of .012 for local governments
and F-I-RE firms. Thus, the seven sectors provide relatively distinct contexts in
which to test the collective action hypothesis.
Surprisingly, given alarm about the growing dominance of institutions, direct
lobbying is rare at the firm level. The natural resource sector evidences the highest
participation rate of 4.00%; an average state’s 453.82 natural resource firms gen-
erating an average 18.16 lobby registrations. Local government and TUC partic-
ipation rates were somewhat lower: 2.60 and 1.04%, respectively. Given the sizes
of the two sectors, these participation rates generate in the average state, respec-
tively, 45.54 and 48.46 lobby registrations. Manufacturing, F-I-RE, and agricul-
ture participation are an order of magnitude lower (.87, .35, and .24, respectively),
with average registrations of 61.76, 33.28, and 5.60, respectively. And construc-
tion firms participate the least; on average, less than .05 of a percent of these
firms lobby. Given their great number, however, this still produces 5.60 registra-
tions in the typical state. Thus, lobby participation rates are quite low for all seven
sectors.
As a first cut in assessing the collective action hypothesis, we regressed par-
ticipation rates as a power function on number of institutions for all seven sectors.
The construction and agricultural models could not be estimated as power func-
tions, however, given the presence of several cases with zero registrations.
Instead, logarithmic functions were used for these models.7 The results presented
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7 The addition of a small constant (.001) to the dependent variables in order to use the same esti-
mation technique across all seven sectors generated very similar results to the logarithmic models.
in Figures 1 though 7 provide strong support for the collective action hypothe-
sis. That is, participation rates decline in six of seven cases, but at a declining
rate, as the number of institutions in a given sector in a state increase. Still, the
results vary. They are especially strong for the manufacturing (R2 = .684), natural
resource (.671), and T-U-C (.600) sectors. Only the construction sector produced
weak results (R2 = .062) and a nearly linear logarithmic function. This likely
reflects the large number of truly tiny firms in the construction industry, an issue
that may be addressed by our addition of controls.
The curvilinear relationships in the figures make two points. First, their steeply
negative linear elements—where the bulk of states are—tell us that free riding is
a serious problem for institutions. The decline in participation rates as institu-
tional populations grow implies that much of what institutions lobby for concern
collective benefits. But second, the curvilinear element reported for six of seven
sectors at least suggests the possibility that selective benefits remain on the
agendas of some institutions lobbying on their own. Even in large populations
providing few incentives to pursue collective goods, some institutions remain in
their state capitals seeking influence over public policy.
We cannot, of course, determine with these data what these institutions lobby
for. They may include institutions committed to lobbying for collective goods
Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions 693
y = 47.503x-0.4441 R2 = 0.6836
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 50000
No. of Manufacturing Firms
Fi
rm
 P
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
R
at
e
FIGURE 1
Scattergram of Number of Manufacturing Firms and Firm Lobby
Participation Rate
694 David Lowery et al.
y = -0.0144Ln(x) + 0.1887 R2 = 0.0619
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
No. of Construction Firms
Fi
rm
 P
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
R
at
e
FIGURE 2
Scattergram of Number of Construction Firms and Firm Lobby
Participation Rate
even in the face of incentives to free ride. Or, they may be very large firms for
whom the marginal costs of lobbying for collective goods are small relative to
their marginal share of the collective benefit. But we think it far more plausible
that, given Olson’s analysis of the decision to participate as a form of rational
calculus, they seek selective benefits and cannot, therefore, afford to abandon the
lobbying task. Indeed, Olson argued that collective benefits can take on many of
the characteristics of selective benefits when one’s share of the collective benefit
becomes large. But even if selective or quasi-selective benefits justify their lob-
bying while others free ride, their efforts surely provide along the way some col-
lective representation for their stay-at-home brethren. In very large populations,
then, collective representation may be limited to that either provided by associa-
tions or generated by individual firms as a by-product of their pursuit of selec-
tive benefits.
Do these results survive the addition of control variables and use of a polyno-
mial specification to unpack the linear and curvilinear components of the rela-
tionships?8 As seen in Table 1, the number of institutions variable generates
8 Some may not like our proportional dependent variable. We also estimated the models with raw
numbers of institutional registrations as a dependent variable. The results are similar in all important
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uniformly negative and significant estimates, indicating that participation rates
decline as number of institutions grow. But the firm-squared term (divided by
100,000 for ease of presentation) generates uniformly positive coefficients, indi-
cating that the decline in participation rates moderates as number of institutions
increases. All of the estimates of the squared term are significant at the usual cri-
terion levels except for the construction sector, although it too was discernible at
the .10 level. Still, the construction sector results are now largely consistent with
those of the other six sectors. This consistent pattern of results suggests that direct
institutional lobbying—across a wide range of levels of participation—is highly
conditioned by problems of free riding.
The control variables produced varied results. None of the estimates for change
in GSP and party competition were significant. And only the F-I-RE sector’s
number of associations estimate was negative and significant, suggesting that the
availability of more associations reduces direct lobbying. The results for the two
respects—the appropriate signs and significance of the estimates indicating a curvilinear registration
response function to number of firms in each sector. In these models, however, it is far more difficult
to sort out the independent impact of total registrations, since these are so strongly related to the raw
numbers of registrations in any one sector. Thus, we prefer the specification presented here.
remaining controls are more noteworthy. Except for agriculture, the average firm
size estimate was positive as expected, indicating that propensities to lobby
increase with the average size of institutions within a sector within a state. The
exception was not statistically discernible, however. And two of the correctly
signed estimates—manufacturing and F-I-RE—were significant at only the .10
level. But two others—for construction and local government—were highly sig-
nificant. While these sectors produced two of the weaker bivariate plots in Figure
1, their results in Table 1 provide stronger evidence of free riding. Thus, con-
trolling for firm size sharpened the evidence in support of the collective action
hypothesis. Last, number of nonsector registrations generated positive and sig-
nificant estimates in the manufacturing, construction, T-U-C, and F-I-RE sectors.
Comparing Institutions and Voluntary Organizations
The results in Table 1 provide strong evidence that problems of free riding
weigh heavily on direct lobbying by institutions. In this regard, then, they are not
so very different from voluntary associations, either associations with institutions
as members or membership groups with individuals as members. But how similar
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are they? This is a very difficult question to answer for two reasons. First, com-
paring all institutions with all membership groups and all associations requires a
high level of aggregation, aggregation that will subsume many important differ-
ences across many types of organizations within each sector. Indeed, this is the
very reason we have argued that a within-industry or sector, multiple population
design is to be preferred over conventional PAC tests of the collective action
hypothesis.
Second, the collective action problem bears differently on the lobby participa-
tion rates of voluntary organizations and direct lobbying by institutions. Partici-
pation rates in direct institutional lobbying are directly affected by free riding. As
we have seen, free riding influences the proportion of institutions in a state willing
to lobby. The impact of free riding on voluntary organizations entails, however,
a two-step process. That is, free riding first influences the number of institutions
willing to join trade associations or the number of individuals willing to join
membership groups. The second step in this process concerns the organization-
level impacts of this membership effect. If rates of joining are lower when there
are many potential members, such as in larger states or in trades with many firms,
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then it may be more difficult to mobilize or sustain interest organizations. For our
data, this means that we should see lower rates of lobbying by voluntary organ-
izations in larger states than in smaller states. So, any effort to contrast the
impacts of free riding on the presence in lobbying communities of voluntary
organizations and institutions lobbying on their own behalf necessarily entails
something of an apples and oranges comparison. The impact of free riding on
direct institutional lobbying is direct. For voluntary organizations, in contrast, it
has a secondary impact by influencing organizational survival rates.
Still, the conventional explanation of bias in interest communities rests on 
precisely these kinds of comparisons. So, with our reservations in mind, we can
provide a broad comparison by looking at the relationship between the global
participation rates of institutions, associations, and membership groups in lob-
bying state legislatures. Making this comparison requires that we find a common
measure of participation appropriate across all three types of organized interests
comparable to our participation rate measure for firms. For the numerator, we use
the total number of each type of organization registered to lobby in a state. The
denominator in each case is state size, as measured by 1996 GSP. This measure
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puts all three types of interest organizations on a common scale by specifying
the rate at which a state produces interest organizations registered to lobby rela-
tive to the size of its economy.9
Figure 8 reports the results from regressing the three sets of participation scores
for the states on the measure of state size. As seen in the top right of the figure,
the capacity of state economies to produce the three types of organizations differs
somewhat. But given our high level of aggregation and the likelihood that we 
are comparing apples and oranges, these differences are likely less important 
than the overall similarity of the three response curves. That is, the participation
rates of institutions, associations, and membership groups all decline sharply, 
but then flatten, as states become larger. A given unit of GSP produces fewer
interest organizations of all types as state economies increase in size. The key
point to be drawn from this rough demonstration is that while collective action
problems do seem to handicap direct lobbying by institutions as states become
larger, it does not seem to either advantage or disadvantage them with respect to
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9 GSP is a good surrogate indicator because number of institutions increases in a nearly linear
manner with GSP for nearly all economic sectors (Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2002).
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the economic size response paths of voluntary organizations. In short, those who
have used Olson’s analysis to explain bias in interest communities are wrong in
two key respects. First, institutions engaged in direct lobbying are not immune
to problems of collective action. And second, the severity of the collective action
problems they face means that state size influences the population of institutions
engaged in lobbying in much the same manner and degree as it affects the pop-
ulation of voluntary organizations engaged in lobbying.
Conclusion
Contrary to the tepid evidence of free riding in prior literature, we found very
strong and consistent evidence across the seven sectors that problems of collec-
tive action influence participation rates in direct lobbying by institutions. Insti-
tutions are not immune to problems of collective action. And while the evidence
presented in Figure 8 must be viewed more tentatively, the collective action
problem facing populations of institutions that might lobby directly seems to
render their responsiveness to state size quite similar to that of voluntary organ-
izations. Importantly, while our findings challenge a standard explanation of bias
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in interest communities, they do not challenge Olson’s analysis. Indeed, our find-
ings suggest that Olson’s analysis of the collective action problem is more broadly
applicable than commonly allowed. But if free riding bears strongly on both vol-
untary organizations and institutions engaged in direct lobbying, then account-
ing for variations in the diversity or bias of interest communities may require
much more than all too easy reference to Olson’s view that some kinds of organ-
izations are more severely burdened by problems of free riding than others. In all
likelihood, such a new theory of bias in or the diversity of interest communities
will entail the difficult task of determining how variations in the economies of
scale of political organization, the heterogeneity of interests, and government
involvement influence lobbying participation rates across the full range of organ-
ized interests seeking to influence government. Developing such a theory is
beyond the scope of this paper, although significant elements of it have been
developed recently (Gray, Lowery, and Wolak 2001; Lowery and Gray 1998b,
2001; Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2002). Rather, our major finding is that such
a new theory is needed. Older theories of bias built on assumptions about dif-
ferential rates of free riding are flawed.
Last, we offer three caveats. First, our results speak neither to the absolute
degree of imbalance between voluntary and nonvoluntary organizations found in
all interest communities nor the relative power of these different kinds of organ-
izations. Bias in representation may well be real, especially so when weighted 
by profound differences in access to the resources used to influence public 
policy. Second, our results do not suggest that many of the factors found to be
important in PAC studies are unimportant. These include firm size, firm and
industry dependence on the policy process, interlocking directorates, and a
number of other factors. All are likely important in explaining differences in par-
ticipation across industries or firms. But controlling for these factors renders
cross-industry tests of the collective action hypotheses very difficult. We have
sidestepped these problems by employing a multistate, within-industry design.
The use of this design, however, means that our results can tell us little about the
role of other variables that surely matter in an institution’s decision to seek influ-
ence. And third, it should be obvious that these results do not imply that larger
states have fewer institutions engaged in lobbying. Even at lower rates, larger
states still have so many more institutions that might engage in lobbying that they
still generate larger registration rolls. Studies of the population density of com-
munities of organized interests, however, require different models than those
testing hypotheses framed at the level of the individual firm or citizen (Gray and
Lowery 1996).10
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10 Still, this analysis bears on demographic analyses of interest communities in one key 
respect. Gray and Lowery (2001b) report that density dependence of interest communities results
equally from higher birth and death rates of interests in larger states. Our findings suggest that, at
least for direct institutional lobbying, lower birth rates in larger interest systems are likely due to free
riding.
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